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How sensitive are the migration choices of top-income workers to
the tax burden?
Researchers study EU footballers' careers, top tax rates and favourite tax
schemes in 16 countries between 2007 and 2016 - by Rinaldo Brau and Cristian
Usala
In an environment with low migration costs and relevant tax rate differentials among countries, the net
balance of top-income individuals’ flow is a crucial policy issue. For a single country or region, depending
on people’s sensitivity to tax differentials, setting higher taxation rates may originate a leakage of highly
productive workers, with a related reduction in fiscal revenue. On the other hand, fostering fiscal
competition with lower general taxation or favourite schemes may induce a classical rat race where all
the players end up in a suboptimal outcome.
To assess how sensitive are the migration choices of top-incomes to the tax burden, we focused on the
European football market, analysing data regarding footballers’ career, overall top tax rates (henceforth,
top MTR), and favourite tax schemes in 16 countries between 2007 and 2016. Our choice is motivated
by the fact that not only are European footballers top income-earners, but they are even likely to provide
an upper bound to individuals’ tax-induced mobility, mainly because athletes have a shorter-than-
average work horizon (15-20-year max). A third motivation is related to the availability of good data:
those from the OECD, Eurostat, and national archives for tax rates at the national and local levels, and
special rules aimed at attracting foreigners with preferential tax schemes. The transfermarkt.com site for
data on football players and national leagues is one of the most important online communities of football
supporters providing various detailed information on players and teams.
We have found evidence of two composition effects for which top income taxation is likely to have had
an impact. The first one is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the share of footballers working (i.e.,
playing) in their own country against the top MTR. As can be easily seen, the higher the top MTR, the
lower the share (and, implicitly, the absolute number) of domestic players. It is worth remembering that
this simple bivariate analysis is not informative of whether the relationship is mainly driven by moving
abroad, being displaced by incoming foreigners, or simply leaving the market.
Figure 1. The relationship between players nationality and top tax rates in Europe
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The second composition effect is made explicit thanks to the exploitation of one crucial information
provided by transfermarkt.com, namely, the ‘market value’ of footballers (as inferred from the evaluations
of the community of users). This variable represents a good guess of a player’s position in the income
bracket. Indeed, distinguishing between 1%, 0.1%, or 0.01% may be very informative (e.g., Saez and
Zucman, 2016). Figure 2 sheds light on the evolution of the cross-country distribution of the market value
(once merging all players and teams for each country) in its relationship with the top tax rate. In the
period considered, a clear negative relationship arises between the growth rate of the national level
market values and the average MTR in the country. The higher the MTR, the lower the growth of market
value, meaning countries with higher taxation on top incomes have worsened their relative position vis-à-
vis countries with lower taxation.
Figure 2. The relationship between the evolution of national leagues market values and top MTR in Europe




Top income employees (even of a peculiar type) do not decide where to work independently. They need
an employer hiring them! In other words, migration is the by-product of the changes in the net benefits
that teams and players jointly obtain from their matches. Lower tax rates can improve leagues’ overall
quality by attracting more top-quality players. At the same time, this may displace low-quality ones,
inhibiting them from avoiding high taxation rates. In an ongoing research project, we are dealing with this
issue by applying the Maximum Score Matching, an econometric method that permits to account
explicitly for employers’ role (here, football teams) in the mobility of employees (here, football players).
Each observed team-player match is considered the outcome of a matching process where agents
compete to match their preferred partners. This technique is robust to lack of information on wages and
agent-specific characteristics and allows us to simulate various scenarios with different assumptions
regarding the dimension and nature of the labour demand, namely whether the number of jobs is fairy
fixed or completely flexible (elastic demand).
The role of marginal taxation incentives is confirmed within this context where demand and supply
match. In an elastic labour demand scenario, a 1% reduction in tax rate increases players’ numbers by
around 0.2%. The effect is highly heterogeneous: a) foreigners are much more sensitive than natives (up
to five times); b) top players (which presumably are top earners) are more sensitive than low-quality
ones. Especially in a context of rigid demand (UEFA and national regulations may limit the maximum
number of players that can be enrolled on a yearly base), the combination of the two effects can entail
18/12/2020 How sensitive are the migration choices of top-income workers to the tax burden? | LSE Business Review
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2020/11/24/how-sensitive-are-the-migration-choices-of-top-income-workers-to-the-tax-burden/ 4/4
November 24th, 2020 | Economics & Finance | 0 Comments
that a reduction in tax rate may improve the average quality of the league, by attracting top players who
displace low-quality ones.
An equilibrium migration of 0.2% for a 1% increase of the MTR entails a revenue maximising tax rate of
82%. It turns out that substantial taxation of top incomes may be effective even in a context with poor
international tax coordination. However, this is likely to be achieved at the expense of someone captive
to the local economy (“not very top” and “natives”). Future research effort can be devoted to different
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